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econ.TH2025
The Implementability of Liberalism
Héctor Hermida-Rivera
This note shows that under the unrestricted domain, there exists a choice liberal and Nash implementable social choice rule if and only if there are at least three players and the…
econ.TH2025
Self-Equivalent Voting Rules
Héctor Hermida-Rivera
In this paper, I introduce a novel stability axiom for stochastic voting rules, called self-equivalence, by which a voting rule must induce---whenever possible---a convex combinati…
econ.TH2025★ 2 cited
Binary Self-Selective Voting Rules
Héctor Hermida-Rivera, Toygar T. Kerman
This paper introduces a novel binary stability property for voting rules-called binary self-selectivity-by which a society considering whether to replace its voting rule using itse…