1 citations · 1 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for
4 papers
Incentivizing Knowledge Transfers
Zhonghong Kuang, Yi Liu, Dong Wei
We study the optimal design of relational contracts that incentivize an expert to share specialized knowledge with a novice. While the expert fears that a more knowledgeable novice…
Turning the Ratchet: Dynamic Screening with Multiple Agents
Mehmet Ekmekci, Lucas Maestri, Dong Wei
We study a dynamic contracting problem with multiple agents and limited commitment. A principal seeks to screen efficient agents using one-period contracts, but is tempted to revis…
Learning from Manipulable Signals
Mehmet Ekmekci, Leandro Gorno, Lucas Maestri +2
We study a dynamic stopping game between a principal and an agent. The agent is privately informed about his type. The principal learns about the agent's type from a noisy performa…
Optimal Attention Management: A Tractable Framework
Elliot Lipnowski, Laurent Mathevet, Dong Wei
A well-intentioned principal provides information to a rationally inattentive agent without internalizing the agent's cost of processing information. Whatever information the princ…