5 papers
Equilibrium Architecture in Multi-Battle Contests with Count-Dependent Prizes
Zhonghong Kuang, Jingfeng Lu
We study how aggregating local victories shapes participation and equilibrium uniqueness. Two contestants with possibly different marginal costs compete across identical Tullock ba…
Dividing the Spoils: Strategic Prize Allocation in Team Contests
Zhonghong Kuang, Jingfeng Lu, Yiyao Zhu
Rival teams compete through battles and reward members only after team victory. We study how team managers allocate victory-contingent reward budgets across players to maximize the…
Generalized Multidimensional Contests with Asymmetric Players: Equilibrium and Optimal Prize Design
Siyuan Fan, Zhonghong Kuang, Jingfeng Lu
We study -dimensional Tullock contests between two players with heterogeneous effort costs. We establish sharp bounds on discriminatory power ensuring that equilibrium is un…
Strategy-proof Market Segmentation against Price Discrimination
Zhonghong Kuang, Sanxi Li, Yi Liu +1
Data regulations increasingly enable consumers to switch among market segments, making segmentation an endogenous outcome of strategic interaction. We study a model in which consum…
Incentivizing Knowledge Transfers
Zhonghong Kuang, Yi Liu, Dong Wei
We study the optimal design of relational contracts that incentivize an expert to share specialized knowledge with a novice. While the expert fears that a more knowledgeable novice…