4 papers
To Wait or To Probe: Arbitrage Competition on High-Throughput Blockchains
Fei Wu, Burak Öz
Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) on high-throughput blockchains can be captured through targeted search, where bots identify opportunities off-chain and submit route-committed trans…
Measuring CEX-DEX Extracted Value and Searcher Profitability: The Darkest of the MEV Dark Forest
Fei Wu, Danning Sui, Thomas Thiery +1
This paper provides a comprehensive empirical analysis of the economics and dynamics behind arbitrages between centralized and decentralized exchanges (CEX-DEX) on Ethereum. We ref…
From Competition to Centralization: The Oligopoly in Ethereum Block Building Auctions
Fei Wu, Thomas Thiery, Stefanos Leonardos +1
Block production on the Ethereum blockchain has adopted an auction-based mechanism known as Proposer--Builder Separation (PBS), where validators outsource block creation to builder…
Strategic Bidding Wars in On-chain Auctions
Fei Wu, Thomas Thiery, Stefanos Leonardos +1
The Ethereum block-building process has changed significantly since the emergence of Proposer-Builder Separation. Validators access blocks through a marketplace, where block builde…