activity
20222025
most citedGeneralized Principal-Agent Problem with a Learning Agent

1 citations · 3 across the 8 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

8 papers

cs.GT2025

WOMAC: A Mechanism For Prediction Competitions

Siddarth Srinivasan, Tao Lin, Connacher Murphy +3

Competitions are widely used to identify top performers in judgmental forecasting and machine learning, and the standard competition design ranks competitors based on their cumulat…

cs.GT2025

Explainable Information Design

Yiling Chen, Tao Lin, Wei Tang +1

Optimal signaling schemes in information design (Bayesian persuasion) often involve randomization or disconnected partitions of state space, which might be too intricate to be audi…

cs.GT2025

Learning a Game by Paying the Agents

Brian Hu Zhang, Tao Lin, Yiling Chen +1

We study the problem of learning the utility functions of no-regret learning agents in a repeated normal-form game. Differing from most prior literature, we introduce a principal w…

cs.IR2024

User-Creator Feature Polarization in Recommender Systems with Dual Influence

Tao Lin, Kun Jin, Andrew Estornell +3

Recommender systems serve the dual purpose of presenting relevant content to users and helping content creators reach their target audience. The dual nature of these systems natura…

cs.GT2024★ 1 cited

Bias Detection Via Signaling

Yiling Chen, Tao Lin, Ariel D. Procaccia +2

We introduce and study the problem of detecting whether an agent is updating their prior beliefs given new evidence in an optimal way that is Bayesian, or whether they are biased t…

cs.GT2024★ 1 cited

Generalized Principal-Agent Problem with a Learning Agent

Tao Lin, Yiling Chen

In classic principal-agent problems such as Stackelberg games, contract design, and Bayesian persuasion, the agent best responds to the principal's committed strategy. We study rep…

cs.AI2024

Multi-Sender Persuasion: A Computational Perspective

Safwan Hossain, Tonghan Wang, Tao Lin +3

We consider the multi-sender persuasion problem: multiple players with informational advantage signal to convince a single self-interested actor to take certain actions. This probl…

cs.LG2022★ 1 cited

Sample Complexity of Forecast Aggregation

Tao Lin, Yiling Chen

We consider a Bayesian forecast aggregation model where experts, after observing private signals about an unknown binary event, report their posterior beliefs about the event t…