activity
20232026
most citedNearly Equitable Allocations Beyond Additivity and Monotonicity

1 citations · 1 across the 8 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

9 papers

cs.DS2026

Equitable Colorings of Vertex-Weighted Graphs

Siddharth Barman, Vignesh Viswanathan

We study a generalization of the classical Hajnal-Szemerédi theorem to vertex-weighted graphs. Given a graph with nonnegative vertex weights, a coloring is called -approximately…

cs.GT2026

Existence and Computation of Fair Allocations under Constraints

Siddharth Barman, Ioannis Caragiannis, Sudarshan Shyam

We study fair division of divisible goods under generalized assignment constraints. Here, each good has an agent-specific value and size, and every agent has a budget constraint th…

cs.GT2025

Introspectively Envy-Free and Efficient Allocation of Indivisible Mixed Manna

Siddharth Barman, Paritosh Verma

The existence of allocations that are simultaneously fair and efficient is a central inquiry in fair division. Prominent results show that these complementary desiderata can be ach…

cs.GT2025

Fair and Efficient Allocation of Indivisible Mixed Manna

Siddharth Barman, Vishwa Prakash HV, Aditi Sethia +1

We study fair division of indivisible mixed manna (items whose values may be positive, negative, or zero) among agents with additive valuations. Here, we establish that fairness --…

cs.GT2025

Exact Maximin Share Fairness via Adjusted Supply

Siddharth Barman, Satyanand Rammohan, Aditi Sethia

This work addresses fair allocation of indivisible items in settings wherein it is feasible to create copies of resources or dispose of tasks. We establish that exact maximin share…

cs.GT2025

Fair Division Beyond Monotone Valuations with Applications to Equitable Graph Partitioning

Siddharth Barman, Paritosh Verma

This paper studies fair division of divisible and indivisible items among agents whose cardinal preferences are not necessarily monotone. We establish the existence of fair divisio…

cs.GT2024

Fair Division with Market Values

Siddharth Barman, Soroush Ebadian, Mohamad Latifian +1

We introduce a model of fair division with market values, where indivisible goods must be partitioned among agents with (additive) subjective valuations, and each good additionally…

cs.GT2024

Compatibility of Fairness and Nash Welfare under Subadditive Valuations

Siddharth Barman, Mashbat Suzuki

We establish a compatibility between fairness and efficiency, captured via Nash Social Welfare (NSW), under the broad class of subadditive valuations. We prove that, for subadditiv…

cs.GT2023★ 1 cited

Nearly Equitable Allocations Beyond Additivity and Monotonicity

Siddharth Barman, Umang Bhaskar, Yeshwant Pandit +1

Equitability (EQ) in fair division requires that items be allocated such that all agents value the bundle they receive equally. With indivisible items, an equitable allocation may…