1 citations · 2 across the 7 of their papers we have counts for
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cs.CR2024★ 1 cited
Do we still need canaries in the coal mine? Measuring shadow stack effectiveness in countering stack smashing
Hugo Depuydt, Merve Gülmez, Thomas Nyman +1
Stack canaries and shadow stacks are widely deployed mitigations to memory-safety vulnerabilities. While stack canaries are introduced by the compiler and rely on sentry values pla…
cs.CR2024★ 1 cited
Mon CHÉRI: Mitigating Uninitialized Memory Access with Conditional Capabilities
Merve Gülmez, Håkan Englund, Jan Tobias Mühlberg +1
Up to 10% of memory-safety vulnerabilities in languages like C and C++ stem from uninitialized variables. This work addresses the prevalence and lack of adequate software mitigatio…