1 citations · 1 across the 5 of their papers we have counts for
6 papers · 1 filter
PRISM: Lightweight Enclave Isolation with Prismatic Capabilities
Merve Gülmez, Adam Caulfield, Hakan Englund +2
Trusted execution environments (TEEs) protect sensitive code and data from external interference, but lack inherent memory safety. CHERI can enforce spatial memory safety at the ob…
FRESCO: Complete and Scalable Temporal Safety for CHERI Application Processors
Merve Gülmez, Nils Jordan, Jialun Zhang +4
CHERI provides hardware-enforced spatial memory safety. While prior work extends it with heap temporal safety, stack use-after-return remains unaddressed. Existing defenses fall sh…
PICASSO: Scaling CHERI Use-After-Free Protection to Millions of Allocations using Colored Capabilities
Merve Gülmez, Ruben Sturm, Hossam ElAtali +4
While the CHERI instruction-set architecture extensions for capabilities enable strong spatial memory safety, CHERI lacks built-in temporal safety, particularly for heap allocation…
BLACKOUT: Data-Oblivious Computation with Blinded Capabilities
Hossam ElAtali, Merve Gülmez, Thomas Nyman +1
Lack of memory-safety and exposure to side channels are two prominent, persistent challenges for the secure implementation of software. Memory-safe programming languages promise to…
Do we still need canaries in the coal mine? Measuring shadow stack effectiveness in countering stack smashing
Hugo Depuydt, Merve Gülmez, Thomas Nyman +1
Stack canaries and shadow stacks are widely deployed mitigations to memory-safety vulnerabilities. While stack canaries are introduced by the compiler and rely on sentry values pla…
Mon CHÉRI: Mitigating Uninitialized Memory Access with Conditional Capabilities
Merve Gülmez, Håkan Englund, Jan Tobias Mühlberg +1
Up to 10% of memory-safety vulnerabilities in languages like C and C++ stem from uninitialized variables. This work addresses the prevalence and lack of adequate software mitigatio…