7 citations · 9 across the 7 of their papers we have counts for
6 papers · 1 filter
PICASSO: Scaling CHERI Use-After-Free Protection to Millions of Allocations using Colored Capabilities
Merve Gülmez, Ruben Sturm, Hossam ElAtali +4
While the CHERI instruction-set architecture extensions for capabilities enable strong spatial memory safety, CHERI lacks built-in temporal safety, particularly for heap allocation…
BLACKOUT: Data-Oblivious Computation with Blinded Capabilities
Hossam ElAtali, Merve Gülmez, Thomas Nyman +1
Lack of memory-safety and exposure to side channels are two prominent, persistent challenges for the secure implementation of software. Memory-safe programming languages promise to…
Do we still need canaries in the coal mine? Measuring shadow stack effectiveness in countering stack smashing
Hugo Depuydt, Merve Gülmez, Thomas Nyman +1
Stack canaries and shadow stacks are widely deployed mitigations to memory-safety vulnerabilities. While stack canaries are introduced by the compiler and rely on sentry values pla…
Mon CHÉRI: Mitigating Uninitialized Memory Access with Conditional Capabilities
Merve Gülmez, Håkan Englund, Jan Tobias Mühlberg +1
Up to 10% of memory-safety vulnerabilities in languages like C and C++ stem from uninitialized variables. This work addresses the prevalence and lack of adequate software mitigatio…
Exploring the Environmental Benefits of In-Process Isolation for Software Resilience
Merve Gülmez, Thomas Nyman, Christoph Baumann +1
Memory-related errors remain an important cause of software vulnerabilities. While mitigation techniques such as using memory-safe languages are promising solutions, these do not a…
Friend or Foe Inside? Exploring In-Process Isolation to Maintain Memory Safety for Unsafe Rust
Merve Gülmez, Thomas Nyman, Christoph Baumann +1
Rust is a popular memory-safe systems programming language. In order to interact with hardware or call into non-Rust libraries, Rust provides \emph{unsafe} language features that s…