8 papers
Characterizing Necessary Losers to Explain Tournaments Solutions
Contet Clément, Umberto Grandi, Jérôme Mengin
We study the problem of formally explaining why a candidate was not selected by a given tournament rule, by identifying sub-tournaments in which the candidate loses independently o…
Efficient Elicitation of Collective Disagreements
Mohamed Ouaguenouni, Felipe Garrido-Lucero, Umberto Grandi +2
We analyze the structure of the disagreement among a population of voters over a set of alternatives. Surveys typically ask either for pairwise comparisons, simple and intuitive fo…
Prophet Inequalities with Delayed and Uncertain Acceptance
Emile Martinez, Felipe Garrido-Lucero, Umberto Grandi +1
We introduce the prophet inequality with delayed and uncertain acceptance, a variant of the classical prophet inequality in which a decision-maker sequentially evaluates options wh…
Stability in Online Assignment Games
Emile Martinez, Felipe Garrido-Lucero, Umberto Grandi
The assignment game models a housing market where buyers and sellers are matched, and transaction prices are set so that the resulting allocation is stable. Shapley and Shubik show…
Explaining Tournament Solutions with Minimal Supports
Clément Contet, Umberto Grandi, Jérôme Mengin
Tournaments are widely used models to represent pairwise dominance between candidates, alternatives, or teams. We study the problem of providing certified explanations for why a ca…
Algorithmic Shortlisting in Participatory Budgeting
Juan Zambrano, Clément Contet, Jairo Gudiño-Rosero +3
Participatory budgeting is a democratic innovation that allows citizens to propose and vote on public investment projects. To help organizers manage large volumes of submissions, w…