2 citations · 4 across the 23 of their papers we have counts for
36 papers · 1 filter
Defense Feedback and Global-Game Selection
Georgy Lukyanov, Yaroslav Yosifov
Global games select a unique cutoff when a player's incentive moves monotonically with private information. We show that this logic can fail when a privately informed participant c…
Task Architecture and Learning from Coarse Performance
Ekaterina Korotkova, Georgy Lukyanov
Organizations often learn about competence only from project-level success or failure, even when a project contains several complementary tasks. We compare task architectures by th…
The Price of a Familiar Perspective
Georgy Lukyanov, Ilya Pototskiy
Access to past reports changes how consumers learn about competing information providers. A subscriber who has learned to interpret a familiar source may find an equally competent…
Learning to Interpret Forecasts: Evidence Quality and Source Familiarity
Georgy Lukyanov, Nikita Ogorodnikov
We study how learning about a forecasting method affects a seller's choice of evidence. More evidence improves the current forecast but makes the method's persistent component hard…
Hidden Eligibility and the Credibility of Adoption
Georgy Lukyanov, Mikhail Zolotarev
Public support for early adoption can affect what later users learn from observed choices. An adopter may have favourable private information, or may have received a rebate. We stu…
The Fiscal Alibi: Hidden Spending Needs and Government Reputation
Georgy Lukyanov, Hengrina Ly
A government may ask for a high tax because it faces a genuine expense. The same demand can also be made by a government that intends to keep the proceeds. We study this ambiguity…
Who Enters the Record? Paywalls, Contributor Selection, and Social Learning
Maria Kovalenko, Georgy Lukyanov
This paper studies social learning when buying access to previous decisions also determines whose decision enters the record. Individuals first receive private information and then…
Anonymous Accountability
Georgy Lukyanov, Muslim Salakhov
We ask how an expert panel should disclose auditable conflicts of interest when reports are named and experts care about their reputations for ability. Before sealed binary assessm…
Taxing Capital to Protect It
Georgy Lukyanov, Hengrina Ly
This paper studies the composition of taxation when the government cannot fully commit to respecting private returns after investment. A fiscal authority must finance a given expen…
Reputation without a Control Group
Shubh Lashkery, Georgy Lukyanov
An adviser who warns that a task is difficult may become harder to evaluate when her advice is followed more thoroughly. We study a long-lived adviser and successive short-lived wo…
Effort without Evidence
Georgy Lukyanov
I study how paternalistic concern for descendants' success affects learning about the need for costly effort. Each generation can use a demanding method or experiment with a less d…
Defensive Pessimism: Growth, Culture, and the Survival of Evidence
Georgy Lukyanov
A common monetary standard can expand credit while weakening the alternative practices needed to recover from its failure and identify its cause. I study a growing credit economy i…
Peace Talk and Conflict Traps
Andrei Gyarmathy, Georgy Lukyanov
Costly pre-play messages can deter unnecessary wars - but the same messages can also entrench stalemates once violence begins. We develop an overlapping-generations model of a secu…
Learning to Unlearn: Education as a Remedy for Misspecified Beliefs
Daria Fedyaeva, Georgy Lukyanov, Hannah Tollié
We study education as a remedy for misspecified beliefs in a canonical sequential social-learning model. Uneducated agents misinterpret action histories - treating actions as if th…
Reputation, Disclosure, and the Scope of Entry
Rubik Khachatryan, Georgy Lukyanov
We study how shared response resources affect reputation, entry, and the value of disclosure. A later entrant chooses whether to enter zero, one, or two markets after observing a r…
Belief Diversity and Cooperation
Georgy Lukyanov, David Li
This paper studies a two-player game in which the players face uncertainty regarding the nature of their partner. In this variation of the standard Prisoner's Dilemma, players may…
Collateral and Reputation in a Model of Strategic Defaults
Georgy Lukyanov
This paper builds a finite-horizon model to study the role of physical collateral in a model of strategic defaults, when the borrower can develop reputation for honesty. Asset owne…
The Welfare Effects of Policy Signalling in a Regime Change Game
Georgy Lukyanov
We explore a specific parametric example of a regime change game in which a policymaker defends the status quo against a continuum of atomistic agents who seek to overthrow it. At…
Public Communication in Regime Change games
Georgy Lukyanov, Anastasia Makhmudova
We study a regime change game in which the state and an opposition leader both observe the regime's true strength and may engage in costly communication by manipulating the mean of…
Honesty, Stigma, and Cooperation in an Overlapping-Generations Game
David Li, Georgy Lukyanov
We study a two-period overlapping-generations game in which a young agent interacts with an old agent and carries a binary record into old age. Honest agents cooperate with clear p…
Reputation, Risk, and Visibility
Georgy Lukyanov
When does reputation make experts play it safe, and what policy reverses that? I isolate a single lever - visibility of outcomes. In a two-page model with binary signals and outcom…
Reputational Conservatism in Expert Advice
Georgy Lukyanov, Anna Vlasova
We study expert advice with career concerns and continuous private signals. The principal always implements the safe option, and implements the risky option with a probability incr…
Audit Silence and the Capacity Trap
Georgy Lukyanov
This paper studies how learning about an inspector's capacity affects compliance in a repeated relationship. A functioning inspector chooses effort, but the implementation of an au…
Government Reputation and Fiscal Capacity
Emin Ablyatifov, Georgy Lukyanov
How does uncertain implementation shape fiscal policy over time? We study an uninformed fiscal authority that chooses a distortionary tax-financed mandate and audit intensity while…