5 papers
Acquiring irrelevant information as a commitment
Wataru Kitano, Shohei Yanagita
We formulate the voter's strategic information acquisition to control the future self's action as a Bayesian persuasion problem. Our main result shows that acquiring information th…
An axiomatic model of robust Bayesian persuasion
Wataru Kitano, Shohei Yanagita
We develop an axiomatic model of robust Bayesian persuasion where the sender cannot fully control the information available to the receiver. After selecting an information structur…
Partially rational preferences under ambiguity
Kensei Nakamura, Shohei Yanagita
Completeness and transitivity are standard rationality conditions in economics. However, under ambiguity, decision makers sometimes violate these requirements because of the diffic…
Preferences with Multiple Forecasts
Kensei Nakamura, Shohei Yanagita
When a collective decision maker presents a menu of uncertain prospects to her group members, each member's choice depends on their predictions about payoff-relevant states. In rea…
Cautious Dual-Self Expected Utility and Weak Uncertainty Aversion
Kensei Nakamura, Shohei Yanagita
Gilboa and Schmeidler's (1989) uncertainty aversion plays a central role in decision theory and economics, yet many inconsistent behaviors have been observed in experiments. Motiva…