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cs.GT2025
Mechanism Design with Outliers and Predictions
Argyrios Deligkas, Eduard Eiben, Sophie Klumper +2
We initiate the study of mechanism design with outliers, where the designer can discard agents from the social cost objective. This setting is particularly relevant when some a…
cs.GT2025
Online Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design with Predictions
Georgios Amanatidis, Evangelos Markakis, Christodoulos Santorinaios +3
Augmenting the input of algorithms with predictions is an algorithm design paradigm that suggests leveraging a (possibly erroneous) prediction to improve worst-case performance gua…
cs.GT2023
Partial Allocations in Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design: Bridging Multiple Levels of Service and Divisible Agents
Georgios Amanatidis, Sophie Klumper, Evangelos Markakis +2
Budget-feasible procurement has been a major paradigm in mechanism design since its introduction by Singer (2010). An auctioneer (buyer) with a strict budget constraint is interest…