4 papers
Improved Lower Bounds and Output Augmentation for Facility Location Mechanisms
Rafael Gomes, Sophie Klumper, Guido Schäfer +1
We study the strategic facility location problem under the egalitarian objective, where a mechanism uses the reported locations of a set of agents in Euclidean space to select a fa…
Beyond Stability: Improved Efficiency Guarantees for -Stable Matchings
Isabel Fernandez Abad, Sophie Klumper, Guido Schäfer
Stable matching mechanisms are fundamental to market design but face an inherent tension between stability and social welfare optimality. We study a natural relaxation of stability…
Mechanism Design with Outliers and Predictions
Argyrios Deligkas, Eduard Eiben, Sophie Klumper +2
We initiate the study of mechanism design with outliers, where the designer can discard agents from the social cost objective. This setting is particularly relevant when some a…
Optimal Type-Dependent Liquid Welfare Guarantees for Autobidding Agents with Budgets
Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Sophie Klumper, Twan Kroll +3
Online advertising systems have recently transitioned to autobidding, allowing advertisers to delegate bidding decisions to automated agents. Each advertiser directs their agent to…