1 citations · 1 across the 7 of their papers we have counts for
7 papers
Improved Lower Bounds and Output Augmentation for Facility Location Mechanisms
Rafael Gomes, Sophie Klumper, Guido Schäfer +1
We study the strategic facility location problem under the egalitarian objective, where a mechanism uses the reported locations of a set of agents in Euclidean space to select a fa…
Beyond Stability: Improved Efficiency Guarantees for -Stable Matchings
Isabel Fernandez Abad, Sophie Klumper, Guido Schäfer
Stable matching mechanisms are fundamental to market design but face an inherent tension between stability and social welfare optimality. We study a natural relaxation of stability…
Mechanism Design with Outliers and Predictions
Argyrios Deligkas, Eduard Eiben, Sophie Klumper +2
We initiate the study of mechanism design with outliers, where the designer can discard agents from the social cost objective. This setting is particularly relevant when some a…
Optimal Type-Dependent Liquid Welfare Guarantees for Autobidding Agents with Budgets
Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Sophie Klumper, Twan Kroll +3
Online advertising systems have recently transitioned to autobidding, allowing advertisers to delegate bidding decisions to automated agents. Each advertiser directs their agent to…
To Trust or Not to Trust: Assignment Mechanisms with Predictions in the Private Graph Model
Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Sophie Klumper, Guido Schäfer +1
The realm of algorithms with predictions has led to the development of several new algorithms that leverage (potentially erroneous) predictions to enhance their performance guarant…
Partial Allocations in Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design: Bridging Multiple Levels of Service and Divisible Agents
Georgios Amanatidis, Sophie Klumper, Evangelos Markakis +2
Budget-feasible procurement has been a major paradigm in mechanism design since its introduction by Singer (2010). An auctioneer (buyer) with a strict budget constraint is interest…
Budget Feasible Mechanisms for Procurement Auctions with Divisible Agents
Sophie Klumper, Guido Schäfer
We consider budget feasible mechanisms for procurement auctions with additive valuation functions. For the divisible case, where agents can be allocated fractionally, there exists…