8 papers
Pessimal Elections for Approximately Dominating Sets
Moses Charikar, Prasanna Ramakrishnan, Kangning Wang
Condorcet's paradox is a foundational result in social choice theory, showing that no matter which candidate wins an election, a majority of voters may prefer some losing candidate…
An Exposition of Five Candidates Suffice for a Majority
Moses Charikar, Prasanna Ramakrishnan, Kangning Wang
We give a brief exposition of a result of Song, Nguyen, and Lin (2026) that every election (with ranked preferences) has a Condorcet winning set of at most five candidates.
Distortion of Metric Voting with Bounded Randomness
Ziyi Cai, D. D. Gao, Prasanna Ramakrishnan +1
We study the design of voting rules in the metric distortion framework. It is known that any deterministic rule suffers distortion of at least , and that randomized rules can ac…
Approximately Dominating Sets in Elections
Moses Charikar, Prasanna Ramakrishnan, Kangning Wang
Condorcet's paradox is a fundamental result in social choice theory which states that there exist elections in which, no matter which candidate wins, a majority of voters prefer a…
Fair metric distortion for matching with preferences
Jabari Hastings, Prasanna Ramakrishnan
We consider the matching problem in the metric distortion framework. There are agents and items occupying points in a shared metric space, and the goal is to design a match…
Metric Distortion for Tournament Voting and Beyond
Moses Charikar, Prasanna Ramakrishnan, Zihan Tan +1
In the well-studied metric distortion problem in social choice, we have voters and candidates located in a shared metric space, and the objective is to design a voting rule that se…