4 citations · 4 across the 6 of their papers we have counts for
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econ.TH2025
Equitable Auction Design with Provable Regret Guarantees
Ruiqin Wang, Cagil Kocyigit, Napat Rujeerapaiboon
We study a mechanism design problem where a seller aims to allocate a good to multiple bidders, each with a private value. The seller supports or favors a specific group, referred…
econ.TH2022
Distributionally Robust Optimal Allocation with Costly Verification
Halil İbrahim Bayrak, Çağıl Koçyiğit, Daniel Kuhn +1
We consider the mechanism design problem of a principal allocating a single good to one of several agents without monetary transfers. Each agent desires the good and uses it to cre…