6 papers
A Weakly Group Strategy-Proof and Pareto-Stable Matching Mechanism with Two-Sided Indifferences under Gross Substitutes
Yasushi Kawase, Ryosuke Sato
We study finite many-to-one matching markets with indifferences on both sides and publicly known firm preferences over sets of workers. A standard approach breaks ties uniformly at…
Fractional Assignment with Preferences
Yasushi Kawase, Warut Suksompong, Hanna Sumita +1
We study a fractional assignment setting where objects are to be assigned to agents with unit capacity, and each agent specifies an ideal distribution over the objects. Unl…
Decomposition Envy-Freeness in Random Assignment
Yasushi Kawase, Warut Suksompong, Hanna Sumita +1
In random assignment, fairness is often captured by stochastic-dominance envy-freeness (SD-EF). We observe that assignments satisfying SD-EF may admit decompositions that result in…
Online Algorithms for Repeated Optimal Stopping: Balancing Baseline Guarantees and Regret
Tsubasa Harada, Yasushi Kawase, Hanna Sumita
We study the repeated optimal stopping problem, in which the same optimal stopping instance with an unknown distribution is solved repeatedly over rounds. We aim to simultaneou…
Two-Sided Fairness in Many-to-One Matching
Ayumi Igarashi, Naoyuki Kamiyama, Yasushi Kawase +3
We consider a classic many-to-one matching setting, where participants need to be assigned to teams based on the preferences of both sides. Unlike most of the matching literature,…
Scheduling on Identical Machines with Setup Time and Unknown Execution Time
Yasushi Kawase, Kazuhisa Makino, Vinh Long Phan +1
In this study, we investigate a scheduling problem on identical machines in which jobs require initial setup before execution. We assume that an algorithm can dynamically form a ba…