39 citations · 39 across the 7 of their papers we have counts for
9 papers
Elicitability
Yaron Azrieli, Christopher Chambers, Paul Healy +1
An analyst is tasked with producing a statistical study. The analyst is not monitored and is able to manipulate the study. He can receive payments contingent on his report and trus…
Anonymous voting in a heterogeneous society
Yaron Azrieli, Ritesh Jain, Semin Kim
We study the design of voting mechanisms in a binary social choice environment where agents' cardinal valuations are independent but not necessarily identically distributed. The me…
Sequential Non-Bayesian Persuasion
Yaron Azrieli, Rachana Das
We study a model of persuasion in which the receiver's updating rule systematically distorts Bayesian posteriors. While in the classic Bayesian case providing information sequentia…
Success functions in large contests
Yaron Azrieli, Christopher P. Chambers
We consider contests with a large set (continuum) of participants and axiomatize contest success functions that arise when performance is composed of both effort and a random eleme…
Temporary exclusion in repeated contests
Yaron Azrieli
Consider a population of agents who repeatedly compete for awards, as in the case of researchers annually applying for grants. Noise in the selection process may encourage entry of…
Contracting with Heterogeneous Researchers
Han Wang
We study the design of contracts that incentivize a researcher to conduct a costly experiment, extending the work of Yoder (2022) from binary states to a general state space. The c…
Marginal stochastic choice
Yaron Azrieli, John Rehbeck
Models of stochastic choice typically use conditional choice probabilities given menus as the primitive for analysis, but in the field these are often hard to observe. Moreover, st…
Rental harmony with roommates
Yaron Azrieli, Eran Shmaya
We prove existence of envy-free allocations in markets with heterogenous indivisible goods and money, when a given quantity is supplied from each of the goods and agents have unit…
Lipschitz Games
Yaron Azrieli, Eran Shmaya
The Lipschitz constant of a finite normal-form game is the maximal change in some player's payoff when a single opponent changes his strategy. We prove that games with small Lipsch…