4 papers
Dynamic Cheap Talk without Feedback
Atulya Jain
We study a dynamic sender-receiver game in which the sender observes a state evolving according to a Markov chain but does not observe the receiver's action. Despite the absence of…
On the Inefficiency of Social Learning
Florian Brandl, Wanying Huang, Atulya Jain
We study whether a social planner can restore efficient learning - defined as a finite expected number of incorrect actions -in the canonical sequential social learning model. For…
Randomization and Efficiency under Incomplete Information
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Atulya Jain +1
We study ex-ante Pareto efficiency of feasible outcomes in games with incomplete information. Our main observation is that excessive randomization leads to inefficiency. With a non…
Calibrated Forecasting and Persuasion
Atulya Jain, Vianney Perchet
We study a dynamic game where an expert sends probabilistic forecasts to a decision-maker. The decision-maker verifies these forecasts using a calibration test based on past data.…