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20222026
most citedBudget-Constrained Auctions with Unassured Priors: Strategic Equivalence and Structural Properties

2 citations · 3 across the 9 of their papers we have counts for

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6 papers · 1 filter

cs.GT2025

Incentive Analysis of Collusion in Fair Division

Haoqiang Huang, Biaoshuai Tao, Mingwei Yang +1

We study fair division problems with strategic agents capable of gaining advantages by manipulating their reported preferences. Although several impossibility results have revealed…

cs.GT2025

When is Truthfully Allocating Chores no Harder than Goods?

Bo Li, Biaoshuai Tao, Fangxiao Wang +3

We study the problem of fairly and efficiently allocating a set of items among strategic agents with additive valuations, where items are either all indivisible or all divisible. W…

cs.GT2023

The Incentive Guarantees Behind Nash Welfare in Divisible Resources Allocation

Xiaohui Bei, Biaoshuai Tao, Jiajun Wu +1

We study the problem of allocating divisible resources among agents, hopefully in a fair and efficient manner. With the presence of strategic agents, additional incentive guara…

cs.GT2023

Fair and Almost Truthful Mechanisms for Additive Valuations and Beyond

Biaoshuai Tao, Mingwei Yang

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods among strategic agents. It is well-known that truthfulness is incompatible with any meaningful fairness notions. We…

cs.GT2022

Fairly Allocating (Contiguous) Dynamic Indivisible Items with Few Adjustments

Mingwei Yang

We study the problem of dynamically allocating indivisible items to agents with the restriction that the allocation is fair all the time. Due to the negative results to ach…

cs.GT2022★ 2 cited

Budget-Constrained Auctions with Unassured Priors: Strategic Equivalence and Structural Properties

Zhaohua Chen, Mingwei Yang, Chang Wang +5

In today's online advertising markets, it is common for advertisers to set long-term budgets. Correspondingly, advertising platforms adopt budget control methods to ensure that adv…