3 papers
econ.TH2025
Persuasion with Verifiable Information
Maria Titova, Kun Zhang
This paper studies a game in which an informed sender with state-independent preferences uses verifiable messages to convince a receiver to choose an action from a finite set. We c…
econ.TH2025
Information Design and Full Implementation in Nonatomic Games
Frederic Koessler, Marco Scarsini, Tristan Tomala
This paper studies the implementation of Bayes correlated equilibria in symmetric Bayesian games with nonatomic players, using direct information structures and obedient strategies…
cs.GT2021
Correlated Equilibria in Large Anonymous Bayesian Games
Frederic Koessler, Marco Scarsini, Tristan Tomala
We consider multi-population Bayesian games with a large number of players. Each player aims at minimizing a cost function that depends on this player's own action, the distributio…