activity
20242026
most citedEvaluating the Unseen Capabilities: How Many Theorems Do LLMs Know?

1 citations · 1 across the 4 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

11 papers

cs.LG2026

Improving the Trade-off Between Watermark Strength and Speculative Sampling Efficiency for Language Models

Weiqing He, Xiang Li, Li Shen +2

Watermarking is a principled approach for tracing the provenance of large language model (LLM) outputs, but its deployment in practice is hindered by inference inefficiency. Specul…

math.ST2025

Optimal Detection for Language Watermarks with Pseudorandom Collision

T. Tony Cai, Xiang Li, Qi Long +2

Text watermarking plays a crucial role in ensuring the traceability and accountability of large language model (LLM) outputs and mitigating misuse. While promising, most existing m…

cs.LG2025

On the Empirical Power of Goodness-of-Fit Tests in Watermark Detection

Weiqing He, Xiang Li, Tianqi Shang +3

Large language models (LLMs) raise concerns about content authenticity and integrity because they can generate human-like text at scale. Text watermarks, which embed detectable sta…

stat.ML2025

Theoretical Tensions in RLHF: Reconciling Empirical Success with Inconsistencies in Social Choice Theory

Jiancong Xiao, Zhekun Shi, Kaizhao Liu +2

Despite its empirical success, Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) has been shown to violate almost all the fundamental axioms in social choice theory -- such as majo…

cs.CL20251 cited

Evaluating the Unseen Capabilities: How Many Theorems Do LLMs Know?

Xiang Li, Jiayi Xin, Qi Long +1

Accurate evaluation of large language models (LLMs) is crucial for understanding their capabilities and guiding their development. However, current evaluations often inconsistently…

cs.GT2025

Fundamental Limits of Game-Theoretic LLM Alignment: Smith Consistency and Preference Matching

Zhekun Shi, Kaizhao Liu, Qi Long +2

Nash Learning from Human Feedback is a game-theoretic framework for aligning large language models (LLMs) with human preferences by modeling learning as a two-player zero-sum game.…