7 citations · 16 across the 11 of their papers we have counts for
11 papers
Feedback in Dynamic Contests: Theory and Experiment
Sumit Goel, Yiqing Yan, Jeffrey Zeidel
We study the effect of interim feedback policies in a dynamic all-pay auction where two players bid over two stages to win a common-value prize. We show that sequential equilibrium…
Swap Bounded Envy
Federico Echenique, Sumit Goel, SangMok Lee
We study fairness in the allocation of discrete goods. Exactly fair (envy-free) allocations are impossible, so we discuss notions of approximate fairness. In particular, we focus o…
An efficiency ordering of k-price auctions under complete information
Sumit Goel, Jeffrey Zeidel
We study -price auctions in a complete information environment and characterize all pure-strategy Nash equilibrium outcomes. In a setting with agents having ordered valuatio…
TTC Domains
Sumit Goel, Yuki Tamura
For the object reallocation problem, we study whether characterizations of Top Trading Cycles (TTC) based on individual rationality, efficiency, and strategyproofness on the unrest…
The effect of competition in contests: A unifying approach
Andrzej Baranski, Sumit Goel
We study how increasing competition, by making prizes more unequal, affects effort in contests. In a finite type-space environment, we characterize the equilibrium, analyze the eff…
Multi-agent contract design with a budget
Sumit Goel, Wade Hann-Caruthers
We study a multi-agent contract design problem with moral hazard. In our model, each agent exerts costly effort towards an individual task at which it may either succeed or fail, a…
Optimal tie-breaking rules
Sumit Goel, Amit Goyal
We consider two-player contests with the possibility of ties and study the effect of different tie-breaking rules on effort. For ratio-form and difference-form contests that admit…
Optimal grading contests
Sumit Goel
We study the design of effort-maximizing grading schemes between agents with private abilities. Assuming agents derive value from the information their grade reveals about their ab…
Stable allocations in discrete exchange economies
Federico Echenique, Sumit Goel, SangMok Lee
We study stable allocations in an exchange economy with indivisible goods. The problem is well-known to be challenging, and rich enough to encode fundamentally unstable economies,…
Project selection with partially verifiable information
Sumit Goel, Wade Hann-Caruthers
We consider a principal agent project selection problem with asymmetric information. There are projects and the principal must select exactly one of them. Each project provides…
Optimality of the coordinate-wise median mechanism for strategyproof facility location in two dimensions
Sumit Goel, Wade Hann-Caruthers
We consider the facility location problem in two dimensions. In particular, we consider a setting where agents have Euclidean preferences, defined by their ideal points, for a faci…