1 citations · 1 across the 5 of their papers we have counts for
7 papers
How language model agents reshape price competition
Martin Bichler, Philip Hierhager, Kassian Köck +1
Repeated Bertrand competition is a stringent benchmark for algorithmic pricing: in homogeneous-goods markets, standard learning procedures typically select the stage-game Nash outc…
Algorithmic Predation: Equilibrium Analysis in Dynamic Oligopolies with Smooth Market Sharing
Fabian Raoul Pieroth, Ole Petersen, Martin Bichler
Predatory pricing -- where a firm strategically lowers prices to undermine competitors -- is a contentious topic in dynamic oligopoly theory, with scholars debating practical relev…
Verifying Approximate Equilibrium in Auctions
Fabian R. Pieroth, Tuomas Sandholm
In practice, most auction mechanisms are not strategy-proof, so equilibrium analysis is required to predict bidding behavior. In many auctions, though, an exact equilibrium is not…
Equilibrium Computation in Multi-Stage Auctions and Contests
Fabian R. Pieroth, Nils Kohring, Martin Bichler
We compute equilibrium strategies in multi-stage games with continuous signal and action spaces as they are widely used in the management sciences and economics. Examples include s…
On the Convergence of Learning Algorithms in Bayesian Auction Games
Martin Bichler, Stephan B. Lunowa, Matthias Oberlechner +2
Equilibrium problems in Bayesian auction games can be described as systems of differential equations. Depending on the model assumptions, these equations might be such that we do n…
Enabling First-Order Gradient-Based Learning for Equilibrium Computation in Markets
Nils Kohring, Fabian R. Pieroth, Martin Bichler
Understanding and analyzing markets is crucial, yet analytical equilibrium solutions remain largely infeasible. Recent breakthroughs in equilibrium computation rely on zeroth-order…
-Rank-Collections: Analyzing Expected Strategic Behavior with Uncertain Utilities
Fabian R. Pieroth, Martin Bichler
Game theory relies heavily on the availability of cardinal utility functions, but in fields such as matching markets, only ordinal preferences are typically elicited. The literatur…