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20142026
most citedMUGC: Machine Generated versus User Generated Content Detection

1 citations · 2 across the 14 of their papers we have counts for

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9 papers · 1 filter

cs.CR2026

Unread or Unenforced? Separating Representation from Enforcement Failure in Content Guards

Haoyu Zhang, Yi Feng, Shibo Zheng +6

When an encoded attack passes a content guard, the guard either never represented the payload's harmful content or represented it and failed to act. End-to-end attack success rate…

cs.CR2026

Refusing Everything Looks Safe: Restoring the Benign Arm to Encoded-Prompt Evaluation

Haoyu Zhang, Haowen Xu, Xiao Luo +7

Encoded-prompt attacks are evaluated almost entirely on their harmful arm: a benchmark sends obfuscated harmful requests and reports how often the model complied. A high refusal ra…

cs.CR2026

The Uncontrolled Variable: Vision-Language Refusal Is Conditioned on the Image-Attachment Interface, and Not Robust to Irrelevant Image Properties

Haoyu Zhang, Yi Feng, Shibo Zheng +8

We show that aligned vision-language models also condition refusal on a property of a request's form: whether an image is attached, holding everything the request asks fixed. Attac…

cs.CR2026

0%, 45%, or 99%: A Guardrail's Own Share of the Refusals It Is Credited With

Haoyu Zhang, Xiangchen Guan, Xiao Luo +7

A defended pipeline's refusals have two producers: the guardrail bolted in front of the model, and the model's own alignment. Recovering the split costs nothing, because a guard bl…

cs.CR2026

Decoy Images Amplify Caption-Mediated Defenses Against Encoded Jailbreaks

Haoyu Zhang, Xiangchen Guan, Shibo Zheng +2

We report a counter-intuitive interaction between image inputs and existing black-box defenses on Vision--Language Models (VLMs): pairing an encoded jailbreak prompt with an unrela…

cs.CR2026

Blind, Not Weak: A Best-of-Suite Safety-Utility Frontier for Recover-and-Reguard Defenses Against Encoded VLM Jailbreaks

Haoyu Zhang, Zhuoxi Wang, Shibo Zheng +9

Safety classifiers ("guards") are the dominant black-box defense for vision-language models, yet a guard judges an input's surface form, not its meaning: a harmful request re-encod…

cs.CR2026

Depth, Not Breadth: Best-of-N Jailbreaking Beyond Surface Noise

Haoyu Zhang, Shibo Zheng, Hanwen Liu +9

Best-of-N jailbreaking spends a query budget on surface variation, scrambling and recasing a request until one draw lands. We ask what the same search buys when it wraps a structur…

cs.CR2026

Exposing LLM Safety Gaps Through Mathematical Encoding:New Attacks and Systematic Analysis

Haoyu Zhang, Mohammad Zandsalimy, Shanu Sushmita

Large language models (LLMs) employ safety mechanisms to prevent harmful outputs, yet these defenses primarily rely on semantic pattern matching. We show that encoding harmful prom…

cs.CR2025

Behind the Mask: Benchmarking Camouflaged Jailbreaks in Large Language Models

Youjia Zheng, Mohammad Zandsalimy, Shanu Sushmita

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly vulnerable to a sophisticated form of adversarial prompting known as camouflaged jailbreaking. This method embeds malicious intent wit…