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cs.GT2025
Bandit Learning in Housing Markets
Shiyun Lin
The housing market, also known as one-sided matching market, is a classic exchange economy model where each agent on the demand side initially owns an indivisible good (a house) an…
cs.GT2024
Stable Matching with Ties: Approximation Ratios and Learning
Shiyun Lin, Simon Mauras, Nadav Merlis +1
We study matching markets with ties, where workers on one side of the market may have tied preferences over jobs, determined by their matching utilities. Unlike classical two-sided…
cs.GT2023
Principal-Agent Problem with Third Party: Information Design from Social Planner's Perspective
Shiyun Lin, Zhihua Zhang
We study the principal-agent problem with a third party that we call social planner, whose responsibility is to reconcile the conflicts of interest between the two players and indu…