4 papers
Balanced Contributions in Networks and Games with Externalities
Frank Huettner
For networks with externalities, where each component's worth may depend on the full network structure, balanced contributions and fairness lead to distinct component-efficient all…
Balanced contributions, consistency, and value for games with externalities
André Casajus, Yukihiko Funaki, Frank Huettner
We consider fair and consistent extensions of the Shapley value for games with externalities. Based on the restriction identified by Casajus et al. (2024, Games Econ. Behavior 147,…
Random partitions, potential, value, and externalities
André Casajus, Yukihiko Funaki, Frank Huettner
The Shapley value equals a player's contribution to the potential of a game. The potential is a most natural one-number summary of a game, which can be computed as the expected acc…
Coalitional Manipulations and Immunity of the Shapley Value
Christian Basteck, Frank Huettner
We consider manipulations in the context of coalitional games, where a coalition aims to increase the total payoff of its members. An allocation rule is immune to coalitional manip…