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20232026
most citedEnvy-free House Allocation under Uncertain Preferences

1 citations · 1 across the 11 of their papers we have counts for

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cs.GT2026

Pairwise Maximin Share Allocations Need Not Exist

Haris Aziz

We study the fair allocation of indivisible goods among agents with strictly positive additive valuations. Pairwise maximin share fairness (PMMS) asks that, for every ordered pair…

cs.GT2026

Sampford Apportionment Satisfies Threshold Monotonicity

Haris Aziz, Simon Mackenzie, Mashbat Suzuki

Apportionment distributes a fixed number of legislative seats among political parties in proportion to their vote shares. Randomization can satisfy quota in every realization and e…

cs.GT2026

Anchoring for Truthfulness: The Random-Anchor Volume Mechanism for Multi-Facility Location

Haris Aziz, Simon Mackenzie, Mashbat Suzuki

We study the strategyproof placement of \(k\) facilities on the real line for \(n\) agents who privately report their locations, without monetary transfers. For two facilities, the…

cs.GT2026

On the Incompatibility of Weighted PROPX and Pareto Optimality for Indivisible Chores

Haris Aziz, Bo Li

Proportionality (PROP) is one of the simplest fairness criteria for allocating items among agents with additive preferences. With indivisible chores, however, PROP is not always sa…

cs.GT2026

Fair Allocation of Divisible Goods under Non-Linear Valuations

Haris Aziz, Zixu He, Xinhang Lu +1

We study the problem of dividing homogeneous divisible goods among agents with non-linear valuations. Specifically, the value that an agent gains from a given good depends only on…

cs.GT2026

Best-of-Both-Worlds Fairness for Mixed Goods and Chores

Haris Aziz, Xiaolin Bu, Xinhang Lu +4

We study the fundamental problem of fairly dividing indivisible items among agents with additive utilities. In our model, an item can be a good yielding non-negative utilities to s…

cs.GT2026

Approximate Strategyproofness in Approval-based Budget Division

Haris Aziz, Patrick Lederer, Jeremy Vollen

In approval-based budget division, the task is to allocate a divisible resource to the candidates based on the voters' approval preferences over the candidates. For this setting, B…