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Pairwise Maximin Share Allocations Need Not Exist
Haris Aziz
We study the fair allocation of indivisible goods among agents with strictly positive additive valuations. Pairwise maximin share fairness (PMMS) asks that, for every ordered pair…
Sampford Apportionment Satisfies Threshold Monotonicity
Haris Aziz, Simon Mackenzie, Mashbat Suzuki
Apportionment distributes a fixed number of legislative seats among political parties in proportion to their vote shares. Randomization can satisfy quota in every realization and e…
Anchoring for Truthfulness: The Random-Anchor Volume Mechanism for Multi-Facility Location
Haris Aziz, Simon Mackenzie, Mashbat Suzuki
We study the strategyproof placement of \(k\) facilities on the real line for \(n\) agents who privately report their locations, without monetary transfers. For two facilities, the…
On the Incompatibility of Weighted PROPX and Pareto Optimality for Indivisible Chores
Haris Aziz, Bo Li
Proportionality (PROP) is one of the simplest fairness criteria for allocating items among agents with additive preferences. With indivisible chores, however, PROP is not always sa…
Fair Allocation of Divisible Goods under Non-Linear Valuations
Haris Aziz, Zixu He, Xinhang Lu +1
We study the problem of dividing homogeneous divisible goods among agents with non-linear valuations. Specifically, the value that an agent gains from a given good depends only on…
Best-of-Both-Worlds Fairness for Mixed Goods and Chores
Haris Aziz, Xiaolin Bu, Xinhang Lu +4
We study the fundamental problem of fairly dividing indivisible items among agents with additive utilities. In our model, an item can be a good yielding non-negative utilities to s…
Approximate Strategyproofness in Approval-based Budget Division
Haris Aziz, Patrick Lederer, Jeremy Vollen
In approval-based budget division, the task is to allocate a divisible resource to the candidates based on the voters' approval preferences over the candidates. For this setting, B…
Fair Division with Indivisible Goods, Chores, and Cake
Haris Aziz, Xinhang Lu, Simon Mackenzie +1
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible items and a desirable heterogeneous divisible good (i.e., cake) to agents with additive utilities. In our paper, each indivisi…
Maximum Welfare Allocations under Quantile Valuations
Haris Aziz, Shivika Narang, Mashbat Suzuki
We propose a new model for aggregating preferences over a set of indivisible items based on a quantile value. In this model, each agent is endowed with a specific quantile, and the…
Approximately Fair and Population Consistent Budget Division via Simple Payment Schemes
Haris Aziz, Patrick Lederer, Xinhang Lu +2
In approval-based budget division, a budget needs to be distributed to candidates based on the voters' approval ballots over these candidates. In the pursuit of a simple, consisten…
Neighborhood Stability in Assignments on Graphs
Haris Aziz, Grzegorz Lisowski, Mashbat Suzuki +1
We study the problem of assigning agents to the vertices of a graph such that no pair of neighbors can benefit from swapping assignments -- a property we term neighborhood stabilit…
Committee Monotonicity and Proportional Representation for Ranked Preferences
Haris Aziz, Patrick Lederer, Dominik Peters +2
We study committee voting rules under ranked preferences, which map the voters' preference relations to a subset of the alternatives of predefined size. In this setting, the compat…
Fair Lotteries for Participatory Budgeting
Haris Aziz, Xinhang Lu, Mashbat Suzuki +2
In pursuit of participatory budgeting (PB) outcomes with broader fairness guarantees, we initiate the study of lotteries over discrete PB outcomes. As the projects have heterogeneo…
Envy-free House Allocation under Uncertain Preferences
Haris Aziz, Isaiah Iliffe, Bo Li +3
We study the envy-free house allocation problem when agents have uncertain preferences over items and consider several well-studied preference uncertainty models. The central probl…