2 papers
cs.AI2025
Alignment Faking - the Train -> Deploy Asymmetry: Through a Game-Theoretic Lens with Bayesian-Stackelberg Equilibria
Kartik Garg, Shourya Mishra, Kartikeya Sinha +8
Alignment faking is a form of strategic deception in AI in which models selectively comply with training objectives when they infer that they are in training, while preserving diff…
cs.LG2024
Lynx: Enabling Efficient MoE Inference through Dynamic Batch-Aware Expert Selection
Vima Gupta, Jae Hyung Ju, Kartik Sinha +2
Selective parameter activation provided by Mixture-of-Expert (MoE) models have made them a popular choice in modern foundational models. However, MoEs face a fundamental tension wh…