8 papers
The Geography of (Concurrent) Block Proposing
Ciamac C. Moallemi, Mallesh M. Pai, Dan Robinson +1
The resilience and censorship resistance of a blockchain depend on where the validators and proposers of that blockchain physically operate. We study the economic incentives behind…
The price of anarchy in the max-distance network creation game is not constant
Christoph Schlegel
At edge price , we construct an infinite family of pure Nash equilibria of the unilateral max-distance network creation game with $\PoA\ge2^{\sqrt{\log_2 n}-O(\log\log n)}$. T…
Bi-Compositional Division Rules
Christoph Schlegel
We characterise the division rules for claims problems that satisfy equal treatment of equals, bilateral consistency, composition down, and composition up. The rules are precisely…
Just-in-Time Resale in an Ahead-of-Time Auction for Faster Execution
Burak Öz, Akaki Mamageishvili, Christoph Schlegel +1
We study Arbitrum's Timeboost auction, an ahead-of-time mechanism that sells a 200ms ordering advantage in an otherwise first-come, first-served transaction ordering policy. The ma…
Timing Games: Probabilistic backrunning and spam
Bruno Mazorra, Christoph Schlegel, Akaki Mamageishvili
There are players who compete by timing their actions. An opportunity appears randomly on a time interval. Whoever takes an action the fastest after the opportunity has arisen…
TimeBoost: Do Ahead-of-Time Auctions Work?
Akaki Mamageishvili, Christoph Schlegel, Ko Sunghun +2
We study the performance of the TimeBoost auction, by comparing cumulative fixed time markout of fast lane trades over the TimeBoost interval to bids for the fast lane. Such compar…
On Sybil-proof Mechanisms
Minghao Pan, Bruno Mazorra, Christoph Schlegel +1
We show that in the single-parameter mechanism design environment, the only non-wasteful, symmetric, incentive compatible and Sybil-proof direct mechanism is a second price auction…
Searcher Competition in Block Building
Akaki Mamageishvili, Christoph Schlegel, Benny Sudakov +1
We study the amount of maximal extractable value (MEV) captured by validators, as a function of searcher competition, in blockchains with competitive block building markets such as…