activity
20212025
most citedObvious Manipulability of Voting Rules

13 citations · 18 across the 6 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

6 papers

cs.GT2025

Learning-Augmented Facility Location Mechanisms for Envy Ratio

Haris Aziz, Yuhang Guo, Alexander Lam +1

The augmentation of algorithms with predictions of the optimal solution, such as from a machine-learning algorithm, has garnered significant attention in recent years, particularly…

cs.GT2023★ 1 cited

Nash Welfare and Facility Location

Alexander Lam, Haris Aziz, Toby Walsh

We consider the problem of locating a facility to serve a set of agents located along a line. The Nash welfare objective function, defined as the product of the agents' utilities,…

cs.GT2023★ 2 cited

Proportional Fairness in Obnoxious Facility Location

Alexander Lam, Haris Aziz, Bo Li +2

We consider the obnoxious facility location problem (in which agents prefer the facility location to be far from them) and propose a hierarchy of distance-based proportional fairne…

cs.GT2022★ 2 cited

Random Rank: The One and Only Strategyproof and Proportionally Fair Randomized Facility Location Mechanism

Haris Aziz, Alexander Lam, Mashbat Suzuki +1

Proportionality is an attractive fairness concept that has been applied to a range of problems including the facility location problem, a classic problem in social choice. In our w…

cs.GT2021★ 13 cited

Obvious Manipulability of Voting Rules

Haris Aziz, Alexander Lam

The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that no unanimous and non-dictatorial voting rule is strategyproof. We revisit voting rules and consider a weaker notion of strategyproofne…

cs.GT2021

Strategyproof and Proportionally Fair Facility Location

Haris Aziz, Alexander Lam, Barton E. Lee +1

We focus on a simple, one-dimensional collective decision problem (often referred to as the facility location problem) and explore issues of strategyproofness and proportionality-b…