activity
20192026
most citedThe comparative statics of persuasion

4 citations · 6 across the 11 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

12 papers

econ.TH2026

Comparative Statics of Information Acquisition and Risk Aversion

Antonio Cabrales, Gregorio Curello, Olivier Gossner +1

This paper studies how willingness to pay for information depends on risk aversion. We model a decision maker who faces background risk and can acquire information before choosing…

econ.TH2026

Coalitional bargaining with transfers

Gregorio Curello, Sam Jindani

We consider the problem of bargaining when transfers between agents are possible. Such situations are typically modelled as coalitional games with transferable utilities. However t…

econ.TH2025

Comparative risk attitude and the aggregation of single-crossing

Gregorio Curello, Ludvig Sinander, Mark Whitmeyer

In choice under risk, there is a standard notion of 'less risk-averse than', due to Yaari (1969). In the theory of comparative statics, the single-crossing property is satisfied by…

econ.TH2025

The comparative statics of dominance

Gregorio Curello, Ludvig Sinander, Mark Whitmeyer

In finite problems comprising objects, cases, and an object- and case-contingent payoff function, we study the comparative statics of the set of undominated objects, meaning those…

econ.TH2025

Outside options and risk attitude

Gregorio Curello, Ludvig Sinander, Mark Whitmeyer

We uncover a close link between outside options and risk attitude: when a decision-maker gains access to an outside option, her behaviour becomes less risk-averse, and conversely,…

econ.TH2025

Social choice with transfers

Gregorio Curello, Sam Jindani

We consider the problem of social choice when transfers between agents are possible. This includes several canonical applications: public-good provision, management of a common res…

econ.TH2022★ 4 cited

The comparative statics of persuasion

Gregorio Curello, Ludvig Sinander

In the persuasion model, apart from a few special cases, comparative statics has been an open question. We answer it, delineating which shifts of the sender's interim payoff lead h…

econ.TH2021

Incentives for Collective Innovation

Gregorio Curello

Agents exert hidden effort to produce randomly-sized innovations in a technology they share. Flow payoffs grow as the technology develops, but so does the marginal cost of effort.…

econ.TH2021

Screening for breakthroughs: Omitted proofs

Gregorio Curello, Ludvig Sinander

This document contains all proofs omitted from our working paper 'Screening for breakthroughs'; specifically, the March 2025 version of the paper (arXiv:2011.10090v9).

econ.TH2020★ 1 cited

Screening for breakthroughs

Gregorio Curello, Ludvig Sinander

How best to incentivise prompt disclosure? We study this question in a general model in which a technological breakthrough occurs at an uncertain time and is privately observed by…

econ.TH2020★ 1 cited

Agenda-manipulation in ranking

Gregorio Curello, Ludvig Sinander

We study the susceptibility of committee governance (e.g. by boards of directors), modelled as the collective determination of a ranking of a set of alternatives, to manipulation o…

econ.TH2019

Single-crossing dominance: A preference lattice

Gregorio Curello, Ludvig Sinander

Most comparisons of preferences are instances of single-crossing dominance. We examine the lattice structure of single-crossing dominance, proving characterisation, existence and u…