42 citations · 75 across the 5 of their papers we have counts for
5 papers · 1 filter
Long-term causal effects of economic mechanisms on agent incentives
Panos Toulis, David C. Parkes
Economic mechanisms administer the allocation of resources to interested agents based on their self-reported types. One objective in mechanism design is to design a strategyproof p…
Truthful Prioritization Schemes for Spectrum Sharing
Victor Shnayder, David C. Parkes, Vikas Kawadia +1
We design a protocol for dynamic prioritization of data on shared routers such as untethered 3G/4G devices. The mechanism prioritizes bandwidth in favor of users with the highest v…
Optimal Coordinated Planning Amongst Self-Interested Agents with Private State
Ruggiero Cavallo, David C. Parkes, Satinder Singh
Consider a multi-agent system in a dynamic and uncertain environment. Each agent's local decision problem is modeled as a Markov decision process (MDP) and agents must coordinate o…
Learning and Solving Many-Player Games through a Cluster-Based Representation
Sevan G. Ficici, David C. Parkes, Avi Pfeffer
In addressing the challenge of exponential scaling with the number of agents we adopt a cluster-based representation to approximately solve asymmetric games of very many players. A…
Quantifying the Strategyproofness of Mechanisms via Metrics on Payoff Distributions
Benjamin Lubin, David C. Parkes
Strategyproof mechanisms provide robust equilibrium with minimal assumptions about knowledge and rationality but can be unachievable in combination with other desirable properties…