2 citations · 7 across the 9 of their papers we have counts for
15 papers
From Compensation Design to Budget-Feasible Mechanisms: A Constant Approximation for Subadditive Valuations
Ioannis Anagnostides, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Christopher Liaw +3
Budget-feasible mechanism design is a classic framework introduced by Singer, but there is still a wide gap between existing upper and lower bounds. In this paper, we significantly…
Compensation Design
Ioannis Anagnostides, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Christopher Liaw +5
We introduce compensation design, the problem of designing payment rules that incentivize high-quality contributions in decentralized environments. Here, a budget-constrained princ…
Sponsored Questions and How to Auction Them
Kshipra Bhawalkar, Alexandros Psomas, Di Wang
Online platforms connect users with relevant products and services using ads. A key challenge is that a user's search query often leaves their true intent ambiguous. Typically, pla…
A Unified Approach to Submodular Maximization Under Noise
Kshipra Bhawalkar, Yang Cai, Zhe Feng +2
We consider the problem of maximizing a submodular function with access to a noisy value oracle for the function instead of an exact value oracle. Similar to prior work, we assume…
Position Auctions in AI-Generated Content
Santiago Balseiro, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Yuan Deng +7
We consider an extension to the classic position auctions in which sponsored creatives can be added within AI generated content rather than shown in predefined slots. New challenge…
Equilibria and Learning in Modular Marketplaces
Kshipra Bhawalkar, Jeff Dean, Christopher Liaw +2
We envision a marketplace where diverse entities offer specialized "modules" through APIs, allowing users to compose the outputs of these modules for complex tasks within a given b…
Auto-bidding and Auctions in Online Advertising: A Survey
Gagan Aggarwal, Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Santiago R. Balseiro +23
In this survey, we summarize recent developments in research fueled by the growing adoption of automated bidding strategies in online advertising. We explore the challenges and opp…
Mechanism Design via the Interim Relaxation
Kshipra Bhawalkar, Marios Mertzanidis, Divyarthi Mohan +1
We study revenue maximization for agents with additive preferences, subject to downward-closed constraints on the set of feasible allocations. In seminal work, Alaei~\cite{alaei201…
The Average-Value Allocation Problem
Kshipra Bhawalkar, Zhe Feng, Anupam Gupta +3
We initiate the study of centralized algorithms for welfare-maximizing allocation of goods to buyers subject to average-value constraints. We show that this problem is NP-hard to a…
How to Strategize Human Content Creation in the Era of GenAI?
Seyed A. Esmaeili, Kevin Lim, Kshipra Bhawalkar +3
Generative AI (GenAI) will have significant impact on content creation platforms. In this paper, we study the dynamic competition between a GenAI and a human contributor. Unlike th…
A Field Guide for Pacing Budget and ROS Constraints
Santiago R. Balseiro, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Zhe Feng +4
Budget pacing is a popular service that has been offered by major internet advertising platforms since their inception. Budget pacing systems seek to optimize advertiser returns su…
Simple Mechanisms for Welfare Maximization in Rich Advertising Auctions
Gagan Aggarwal, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Aranyak Mehta +2
Internet ad auctions have evolved from a few lines of text to richer informational layouts that include images, sitelinks, videos, etc. Ads in these new formats occupy varying amou…
Maximizing revenue in the presence of intermediaries
Gagan Aggarwal, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Guru Guruganesh +1
We study the mechanism design problem of selling items to unit-demand buyers with private valuations for the items. A buyer either participates directly in the auction or is re…
Targeting and Signaling in Ad Auctions
Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Haifeng Xu
Modern ad auctions allow advertisers to target more specific segments of the user population. Unfortunately, this is not always in the best interest of the ad platform. In this pap…
Value of Targeting
Kshipra Bhawalkar, Patrick Hummel, Sergei Vassilvitskii
We undertake a formal study of the value of targeting data to an advertiser. As expected, this value is increasing in the utility difference between realizations of the targeting d…