12 citations · 39 across the 21 of their papers we have counts for
10 papers · 1 filter
Freemium Is All You Need
Maxim Bichuch, Aviv Yaish
Free access to a generative AI (GenAI) service requires costly compute, yet can also produce data that improve future service quality. We study a service provider whose users diffe…
Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences
Ruijie Wang, Aviv Yaish
We study auctions where two positions are sold to unit-demand bidders with private heterogeneous order preferences: some are specialists} who value only the first position, while o…
Your Loss is My Gain: Low Stake Attacks on Liquid Staking Pools
Sen Yang, Aviv Yaish, Arthur Gervais +1
Permissionless Proof-of-Stake (PoS) economic security is predicated on the high cost of violating consensus safety or liveness. We show that liquid staking introduces additional ri…
Inequality in the Age of Pseudonymity
Aviv Yaish, Nir Chemaya, Dahlia Malkhi +1
Inequality measures such as the Gini coefficient are used to inform and motivate policymaking, and are increasingly applied to digital platforms. We analyze how measures fare in ps…
TierDrop: Harnessing Airdrop Farmers for User Growth
Aviv Yaish, Benjamin Livshits
Blockchain platforms attempt to expand their user base by awarding tokens to users, a practice known as issuing airdrops. Empirical data and related work implies that previous aird…
: A ZKP Market Mechanism
Wenhao Wang, Lulu Zhou, Aviv Yaish +3
Zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) are computationally demanding to generate. Their importance for applications like ZK-Rollups has prompted some to outsource ZKP generation to a market…
Strategic Vote Timing in Online Elections With Public Tallies
Aviv Yaish, Svetlana Abramova, Rainer Böhme
We study the effect of public tallies on online elections, in a setting where voting is costly and voters are allowed to strategically time their votes. The strategic importance of…
Barriers to Collusion-resistant Transaction Fee Mechanisms
Yotam Gafni, Aviv Yaish
To allocate transactions to blocks, cryptocurrencies use an auction-like transaction fee mechanism (TFM). A conjecture of Roughgarden [44] asks whether there is a TFM that is incen…
Scheduling With Time Discounts
Yotam Gafni, Aviv Yaish
We study a \emph{financial} version of the online problem of scheduling weighted packets with deadlines. The main novelty is that, while prior works assume packets have \emph{fixed…
Discrete & Bayesian Transaction Fee Mechanisms
Yotam Gafni, Aviv Yaish
Cryptocurrencies employ auction-esque transaction fee mechanisms (TFMs) to allocate transactions to blocks, and to determine how much fees miners can collect from transactions. Sev…