collaborators

5 papers

eess.SY2026

Welfarist Control Design -- How to fulfill the societal mandate in multi-agent control?

Sophie Hall, Kai Zhang, Ilia Shilov +2

At the core of most socio-technical systems lies a scarce resource that is allocated among agents: highway lanes, public transit, road space, water rights, energy access, grid capa…

cs.GT2026

Invariant Price of Anarchy and Multiplicative Smoothness

Ilia Shilov, Heinrich H. Nax, Saverio Bolognani

The Price of Anarchy (PoA) is a popular measure of the costs of decentralization in terms of efficiency losses. Almost all PoA analyses operate within a framework assuming both Car…

eess.SY2026

A Welfarist Perspective on Fair Generation Curtailment

Jonas G. Matt, Ilia Shilov, Saverio Bolognani

This paper presents a welfarist approach to fair active power curtailment in distribution grids with distributed photovoltaics. We address the lack of consistent axiomatic foundati…

cs.GT2025

Invariant Price of Anarchy: a Metric for Welfarist Traffic Control

Ilia Shilov, Mingjia He, Heinrich H. Nax +3

The Price of Anarchy (PoA) is a standard metric for quantifying inefficiency in socio-technical systems, widely used to guide policies like traffic tolling. Conventional PoA analys…

math.OC2025

Welfare and Cost Aggregation for Multi-Agent Control: When to Choose Which Social Cost Function, and Why?

Ilia Shilov, Ezzat Elokda, Sophie Hall +2

Many multi-agent socio-technical systems rely on aggregating heterogeneous agents' costs into a social cost function (SCF) to coordinate resource allocation in domains like energy…