5 papers · 1 filter
Asylum Assignment and Burden-Sharing
Gian Caspari, Manshu Khanna
We analyze the problem of matching asylum seekers to member states, incorporating wait times, preferences of asylum seekers, and the priorities, capacities, and burden-sharing comm…
Reserve Systems with Match-Specific Beneficiaries
Yuan Gao, Xi Jin, Manshu Khanna
We study two-sided matching problems in which the designer regards certain participant--institution matches as socially desirable ('beneficiary matches') and seeks to promote such…
Visibly Fair Mechanisms
Inácio Bó, Gian Caspari, Manshu Khanna
Priority-based allocation of individuals to positions are pervasive, and elimination of justified envy is often, an absolute requirement. This leaves serial dictatorship (SD) as th…
Affirmative Action's Cumulative Fractional Assignments
Haydar Evren, Manshu Khanna
India's reservation policy entitles designated groups to fixed fractions of faculty positions. Positions are indivisible, arrive over time across departments, and appointments are…
Non-Standard Choice in Matching Markets
Gian Caspari, Manshu Khanna
We explore the possibility of designing matching mechanisms that can accommodate non-standard choice behavior. We pin down the necessary and sufficient conditions on participants'…