activity
20122026
most citedThe Evolution of Extortion in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Games

315 citations · 490 across the 16 of their papers we have counts for

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9 papers · 1 filter

q-bio.PE2025

Exact conditions for evolutionary stability in indirect reciprocity under noise

Nikoleta E. Glynatsi, Christian Hilbe, Yohsuke Murase

Indirect reciprocity is a key mechanism for large-scale cooperation. This mechanism captures the insight that in part, people help others to build and maintain a good reputation. T…

q-bio.PE2025

Evolution of noisy learning in games

Marta C. Couto, Fernando P. Santos, Christian Hilbe

People make strategic decisions many times a day - during negotiations, when coordinating actions with others, or when choosing partners for cooperation. The resulting dynamics can…

q-bio.PE2024★ 1 cited

The co-evolution of direct, indirect and generalized reciprocity

Saptarshi Pal, Christian Hilbe, Nikoleta E Glynatsi

People often engage in costly cooperation, especially in repeated interactions. When deciding whether to cooperate, individuals typically take into account how others have acted in…

q-bio.PE2023★ 33 cited

Mutation enhances cooperation in direct reciprocity

Josef Tkadlec, Christian Hilbe, Martin A. Nowak

Direct reciprocity is a powerful mechanism for evolution of cooperation based on repeated interactions between the same individuals. But high levels of cooperation evolve only if t…

q-bio.PE2023★ 18 cited

Indirect reciprocity with stochastic rules

Yohsuke Murase, Christian Hilbe

Cooperation is a crucial aspect of social life, yet understanding the nature of cooperation and how it can be promoted is an ongoing challenge. One mechanism for cooperation is ind…

q-bio.PE2022★ 15 cited

Evolution of direct reciprocity in group-structured populations

Yohsuke Murase, Christian Hilbe, Seung Ki Baek

People tend to have their social interactions with members of their own community. Such group-structured interactions can have a profound impact on the behaviors that evolve. Group…

q-bio.PE2021★ 24 cited

Evolutionary instability of selfish learning in repeated games

Alex McAvoy, Julian Kates-Harbeck, Krishnendu Chatterjee +1

Across many domains of interaction, both natural and artificial, individuals use past experience to shape future behaviors. The results of such learning processes depend on what in…

q-bio.PE2016★ 66 cited

Comparing reactive and memory-one strategies of direct reciprocity

Seung Ki Baek, Hyeong-Chai Jeong, Christian Hilbe +1

Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation based on repeated interactions. When individuals meet repeatedly, they can use conditional strategies to enforce…

q-bio.PE2012★ 315 cited

The Evolution of Extortion in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Games

Christian Hilbe, Martin A. Nowak, Karl Sigmund

Iterated games are a fundamental component of economic and evolutionary game theory. They describe situations where two players interact repeatedly and have the possibility to use…