4 citations · 10 across the 26 of their papers we have counts for
12 papers · 1 filter
Nearly Group-Separable Elections
Piotr Faliszewski, Jan Jabrocki, Stanisław Kaźmierowski +3
We study the problem of computing how close a given election is to being group-separable, measuring proximity by swaps of adjacent candidates in the votes. We also consider several…
Individual Rationality in Constrained Hedonic Games: Friends, Enemies, and Neutrals
Šimon Schierreich, Ildikó Schlotter
We study constrained coalition formation in games induced by friends, enemies, and neutrals, under the two standard refinements of additively separable preferences: friend-oriented…
Algorithms for Candidate Control in Greedy Participatory Budgeting Rules
Šimon Schierreich, Krzysztof Sornat
We study the problem of candidate control in participatory budgeting elections. Our focus is on two prominent sequential welfare-based rules---GreedyAV and GreedyCost---which are w…
Network Allocation Games with Anonymous Preferences
Argyrios Deligkas, Eduard Eiben, Šimon Schierreich +1
We study network allocation games in which a set of agents must be allocated to (a subset of) the vertices of a graph topology. The agents are anonymous and strategic: Each of them…
An Entropy Potential for Type-Composition Games
Morteza Alimi, Merlin de la Haye, Pascal Lenzner +3
Potential functions are a key tool in theoretical computer science with applications ranging from the runtime analysis of algorithms and data structures, through the analysis of th…
What Makes Majority Illusion Easy to Detect?
Šimon Schierreich, Ildikó Schlotter
Majority illusion is an undesirable phenomenon in social networks in which agents incorrectly perceive a minority opinion as dominant. This can severely distort collective behavior…
Navigating the Complexity Landscape of Nominee Selection in Schulze Voting
Katarína Cechlárová, Jörg Rothe, Šimon Schierreich +1
We study the Possible President problem and the Necessary President problem for Schulze voting, a rule that, due to its many desirable axiomatic properties, is popular in practice.…
Individual Rationality in Constrained Hedonic Games: Additively Separable and Fractional Preferences
Foivos Fioravantes, Harmender Gahlawat, Nikolaos Melissinos +1
Hedonic games are an archetypal problem in coalition formation, where a set of selfish agents want to partition themselves into stable coalitions. In this work, we focus on two nat…
Optimal Path Planning in Hostile Environments
Andrzej Kaczmarczyk, Šimon Schierreich, Nicholas Axel Tanujaya +1
Coordinating agents through hazardous environments, such as aid-delivering drones navigating conflict zones or field robots traversing deployment areas filled with obstacles, poses…
Stability in Distance Preservation Games on Graphs
Argyrios Deligkas, Eduard Eiben, Tiger-Lily Goldsmith +2
We introduce a new class of network allocation games called graphical distance preservation games. Here, we are given a graph, called a topology, and a set of agents that need to b…
Participatory Budgeting Project Strength via Candidate Control
Piotr Faliszewski, Łukasz Janeczko, Dušan Knop +4
We study the complexity of candidate control in participatory budgeting elections. The goal of constructive candidate control is to ensure that a given candidate wins by either add…
Tight Asymptotic Bounds for Fair Division With Externalities
Frank Connor, Max Dupré la Tour, Vishnu V. Narayan +1
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible items among agents whose preferences include externalities. Unlike the standard fair division model, agents may derive posit…