4 papers
Mechanism Design for Alignment and Control
Dirk Bergemann, Andrew Koh, Stephen Morris
We develop a framework for mechanism design with AI agents whose alignment (preferences) and capabilities (feasible actions and information) are unknown. We want such agents to act…
Information Design and Mechanism Design: An Integrated Framework
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann, Stephen Morris
We develop an integrated framework for information design and mechanism design in screening environments with quasilinear utility. Using the tools of majorization theory and quanti…
Procurement without Priors: A Simple Mechanism and its Notable Performance
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann, Stephen Morris
How should a buyer design procurement mechanisms when suppliers' costs are unknown, and the buyer does not have a prior belief? We demonstrate that simple mechanisms - that share a…
A Strategic Topology on Information Structures
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris, Rafael Veiel
Two information structures are said to be close if, with high probability, there is approximate common knowledge that interim beliefs are close under the two information structures…