2 citations · 3 across the 5 of their papers we have counts for
5 papers
Information Design and Mechanism Design: An Integrated Framework
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann, Stephen Morris
We develop an integrated framework for information design and mechanism design in screening environments with quasilinear utility. Using the tools of majorization theory and quanti…
Procurement without Priors: A Simple Mechanism and its Notable Performance
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann, Stephen Morris
How should a buyer design procurement mechanisms when suppliers' costs are unknown, and the buyer does not have a prior belief? We demonstrate that simple mechanisms - that share a…
Screening and Segmenting: A Consumer Surplus Perspective
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann, Michael C. Wang
We analyze consumer surplus when a monopolist can adjust both prices and product qualities across segments, engaging in second- and third-degree price discrimination simultaneously…
The Optimality of Constant Mark-Up Pricing
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann, Stephen Morris
We consider a nonlinear pricing environment with private information. We provide profit guarantees (and associated mechanisms) that the seller can achieve across all possible distr…
Screening with Persuasion
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann, Stephen Morris
We analyze a nonlinear pricing model where the seller controls both product pricing (screening) and buyer information about their own values (persuasion). We prove that the optimal…