3 papers
econ.TH2026
Screening with Advertisements
Kolagani Paramahamsa
We investigate a seller's revenue-maximizing mechanism in a setting where a desirable good is sold together with an undesirable bad (e.g., advertisements) that generates third-part…
econ.TH2022
Selling to a principal and a budget-constrained agent
Debasis Mishra, Kolagani Paramahamsa
We analyze a model of selling a single object to a principal-agent pair who want to acquire the object for a firm. The principal and the agent have different assessments of the obj…
econ.TH2020
Selling two complementary goods
Komal Malik, Kolagani Paramahamsa
A seller is selling a pair of divisible complementary goods to an agent. The agent consumes the goods only in a specific ratio and freely disposes of excess in either goods. The va…