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cs.GT2026
Pareto-Efficient Multi-Buyer Mechanisms: Characterization, Fairness and Welfare
Moshe Babaioff, Sijin Chen, Zhaohua Chen +1
A truthful mechanism for a Bayesian single-item auction results with some ex-ante revenue for the seller, and some ex-ante total surplus for the buyers. We study the Pareto frontie…
cs.GT2026
Strengthening Bulow-Klemperer-Style Results for Multi-Unit Auctions
Moshe Babaioff, Yiding Feng, Zihan Luo
The classic result of Bulow and Klemperer (1996) shows that in multi-unit auctions with units and buyers whose values are sampled i.i.d. from a regular distribution,…
cs.GT2024
Beyond Regularity: Simple versus Optimal Mechanisms, Revisited
Yiding Feng, Yaonan Jin
A large proportion of the Bayesian mechanism design literature is restricted to the family of regular distributions [Mye81] or the family of monotone hazard…