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math.OC2026

On Mean-field Singular Stochastic Control Problems

Andrea Amato, Federico Cannerozzi, Giorgio Ferrari

We study a class of mean-field control (MFC) problems with singular controls over a finite horizon, allowing for general dependence of the cost functional on the measure argument.…

math.OC2026

Optimal Coarse Correlated Equilibria in Mean Field Games: Linear Programming and No-Regret Learning

Luciano Campi, Federico Cannerozzi, Ioannis Tzouanas

We introduce optimal coarse correlated equilibria for continuous-time mean field games. A coarse correlated equilibrium is a randomized recommendation scheme from which no player c…

math.OC2026

Stationary Mean-Field singular control of an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process

Federico Cannerozzi

Motivated by continuous-time optimal inventory management, we study a class of stationary mean-field control problems with singular controls. The dynamics are modeled by a mean-rev…

math.OC2025

Optimal Policy Characterization for a Class of Multi-Dimensional Ergodic Singular Stochastic Control Problems

Alessandro Calvia, Federico Cannerozzi, Giorgio Ferrari

In ergodic singular stochastic control problems, a decision-maker can instantaneously adjust the evolution of a state variable using a control of bounded variation, with the goal o…

math.OC2024

Cooperation, Correlation and Competition in Ergodic N-player Games and Mean-field Games of Singular Controls: A Case Study

Federico Cannerozzi, Giorgio Ferrari

We consider a class of -player games and mean-field games of singular controls with ergodic performance criterion, providing a benchmark case for irreversible investment games f…

math.OC2023

Coarse correlated equilibria in linear quadratic mean field games and application to an emission abatement game

Luciano Campi, Federico Cannerozzi, Fanny Cartellier

Coarse correlated equilibria (CCE) are a good alternative to Nash equilibria (NE), as they arise more naturally as outcomes of learning algorithms and they may exhibit higher payof…