4 papers
When Should Agents Coordinate in Differentiable Sequential Decision Problems?
Caleb Probine, Su Ann Low, David Fridovich-Keil +1
Multi-robot teams must coordinate to operate effectively. When a team operates in an uncoordinated manner, and agents choose actions that are only individually optimal, the team's…
Multi-Environment POMDPs: Discrete Model Uncertainty Under Partial Observability
Eline M. Bovy, Caleb Probine, Marnix Suilen +2
Multi-environment POMDPs (ME-POMDPs) extend standard POMDPs with discrete model uncertainty. ME-POMDPs represent a finite set of POMDPs that share the same state, action, and obser…
Designing Inferable Signaling Schemes for Bayesian Persuasion
Caleb Probine, Mustafa O. Karabag, Ufuk Topcu
In Bayesian persuasion, an informed sender, who observes a state, commits to a randomized signaling scheme that guides a self-interested receiver's actions. Classical models assume…
Privacy-preserving Nash Equilibrium Synthesis with Partially Ordered Temporal Objectives
Caleb Probine, Abhishek Kulkarni, Ufuk Topcu
Nash equilibrium is a central solution concept for reasoning about self-interested agents. We address the problem of synthesizing Nash equilibria in two-player deterministic games…