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cs.GT2026

What You Earn from What You Learn: Characterization and Complexity of the Value of Information

Ratip Emin Berker, Ioannis Anagnostides, Emanuel Tewolde +3

We examine the value of information in extensive-form decision problems: the largest multiplicative gain that a decision maker can obtain from an information refinement, taken over…

cs.GT2026

Normal-Form Correlation in Markov Games

Ioannis Anagnostides, Constantinos Daskalakis, Gabriele Farina +3

There has been a surge of recent work on correlated equilibrium concepts in Markov games. However, existing results focus on concepts weaker than normal-form correlated equilibria…

cs.GT2026

The Computational Complexity of Team Zero-Sum Games

Ioannis Anagnostides, Ioannis Panageas, Tuomas Sandholm +1

A celebrated consequence of the minimax theorem is that two-player zero-sum games admit a tractable equilibrium characterization. In many central applications, however, each side c…

cs.GT2026

Decision Making under Imperfect Recall: Algorithms and Benchmarks

Emanuel Tewolde, Brian Hu Zhang, Ioannis Anagnostides +2

In game theory, imperfect-recall decision problems model situations in which an agent forgets information it held before. They encompass games such as the ``absentminded driver'' a…

cs.GT2026

The Complexity of Proper Equilibrium in Extensive-Form and Polytope Games

Brian Hu Zhang, Ioannis Anagnostides, Kiriaki Fragkia +2

The proper equilibrium, introduced by Myerson (1978), is a classic refinement of the Nash equilibrium that has been referred to as the "mother of all refinements." For normal-form…

cs.GT2026

(Doubly) Exponential Lower Bounds for Follow the Regularized Leader in Potential Games

Ioannis Anagnostides, Ioannis Panageas, Nikolas Patris +1

Follow the regularized leader FTRL is the premier algorithm for online optimization. However, despite decades of research on its convergence in constrained optimization -- and pote…

cs.GT2026

Equilibrium Refinements Improve Subgame Solving in Imperfect-Information Games

Ondrej Kubicek, Viliam Lisy, Tuomas Sandholm

Subgame solving is a technique for scaling algorithms to large games by locally refining a precomputed blueprint strategy during gameplay. While straightforward in perfect-informat…

cs.GT2025

Convergence of Regret Matching in Potential Games and Constrained Optimization

Ioannis Anagnostides, Emanuel Tewolde, Brian Hu Zhang +3

Regret matching (RM) -- and its modern variants -- is a foundational online algorithm that has been at the heart of many AI breakthrough results in solving benchmark zero-sum games…

cs.GT2025

The Complexity of Equilibrium Refinements in Potential Games

Ioannis Anagnostides, Maria-Florina Balcan, Kiriaki Fragkia +3

The complexity of computing equilibrium refinements has been at the forefront of algorithmic game theory research, but it has remained open in the seminal class of potential games;…

cs.GT2025

Scale-Invariant Regret Matching and Online Learning with Optimal Convergence: Bridging Theory and Practice in Zero-Sum Games

Brian Hu Zhang, Ioannis Anagnostides, Tuomas Sandholm

A considerable chasm has been looming for decades between theory and practice in zero-sum game solving through first-order methods. Although a convergence rate of has long…