9 papers
Price Elasticity of Gas Demand on L1 and L2: Evidence from Ethereum and Arbitrum
Pranay Anchuri, Akaki Mamageishvili
We estimate the causal price elasticity of gas demand on Ethereum mainnet (L1) and Arbitrum One (L2), a quantity necessary for calibrating fee mechanism simulations, evaluating res…
Just-in-Time Resale in an Ahead-of-Time Auction for Faster Execution
Burak Ãz, Burak Öz, Christoph Schlegel +2
We study Arbitrum's Timeboost auction, an ahead-of-time mechanism that sells a 200ms ordering advantage in an otherwise first-come, first-served transaction ordering policy. The ma…
The Cost of Secure Restaking vs. Proof-of-Stake
Akaki Mamageishvili, Benny Sudakov
We compare the total capital efficiency of secure restaking and Proof-of-Stake (PoS) protocols. First, we consider the sufficient condition for the restaking graph to be secure. Th…
Timing Games: Probabilistic backrunning and spam
Bruno Mazorra, Christoph Schlegel, Akaki Mamageishvili
There are players who compete by timing their actions. An opportunity appears randomly on a time interval. Whoever takes an action the fastest after the opportunity has arisen…
On Sybil-proof Mechanisms
Minghao Pan, Bruno Mazorra, Christoph Schlegel +1
We show that in the single-parameter mechanism design environment, the only non-wasteful, symmetric, incentive compatible and Sybil-proof direct mechanism is a second price auction…
TimeBoost: Do Ahead-of-Time Auctions Work?
Akaki Mamageishvili, Christoph Schlegel, Ko Sunghun +2
We study the performance of the TimeBoost auction, by comparing cumulative fixed time markout of fast lane trades over the TimeBoost interval to bids for the fast lane. Such compar…