From the 1 of 7 linked papers with an AI index.
7 papers
Bayesian Fair Division: Truthfulness in Picking Sequence with Correlated Valuations
Xiaolin Bu, Biaoshuai Tao
Sequential allocation mechanisms contain a class of widely studied mechanisms (e.g., round-robin) in the fair division of indivisible goods, where agents take turns picking items i…
Auctions with Contract Design
Xiaolin Bu, Jiarong Jin, Junzhu Ke +6
The paper proposes an auction model where bidders make costly quality investments and the auctioneer uses contract-based transfer rules to reward realized quality, analyzing optima…
Best-of-Both-Worlds Fairness for Mixed Goods and Chores
Haris Aziz, Xiaolin Bu, Xinhang Lu +4
We study the fundamental problem of fairly dividing indivisible items among agents with additive utilities. In our model, an item can be a good yielding non-negative utilities to s…
Truthful and Almost Envy-Free Mechanism of Allocating Indivisible Goods: the Power of Randomness
Xiaolin Bu, Biaoshuai Tao
We study the problem of fairly and truthfully allocating indivisible items to agents with additive preferences. Specifically, we consider truthful mechanisms outputting all…
Logarithmic Comparison-Based Query Complexity for Fair Division of Indivisible Goods
Xiaolin Bu, Zihao Li, Shengxin Liu +2
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to agents, where agents may have different preferences over the goods. In the traditional setting, agents' valua…
Fair Division with Allocator's Preference
Xiaolin Bu, Zihao Li, Shengxin Liu +2
We study the fair allocation of indivisible resources among agents. Most prior work focuses on fairness and/or efficiency among agents. However, the allocator, as the resource owne…