3 papers
q-bio.NC2026
Intrinsic Computational Functionalism and Simulated Consciousness
Ryota Kanai, Shuqin Ma
A common objection to artificial or simulated consciousness is that a simulated brain is no more conscious than simulated water is wet. We address this from the perspective of Intr…
q-bio.NC2026
Intrinsic Computational Functionalism: From Observer-Relative Maps to Observer-Independent Structures
Shuqin Ma, Ryota Kanai
Anti-computational arguments show that externally imposed computational interpretations cannot ground consciousness, but they do not establish that all computational organisations…
q-bio.NC2026
Canonical Functionalism: Defining Functional Structure without Observer-Relative Semantic Maps
Ryota Kanai, Shuqin Ma
Computational functionalism about consciousness is often criticized for relying on observer-relative interpretations of physical systems. This paper proposes a mathematical refinem…